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ARE JURIES JUDGES OF THE LAW AS WELL AS
OF THE FACTS IN CRIMINAL CASES?
A few. weeks ago a jury in a criminal case in New Jersey
signed a written protest against the right of the court to
direct a verdict of acquittal.
Whether the court in this case had in view as a precedent
the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States in the
Southern District of New York, on the case of ex-Judge FurLERTON, does not appear from the statement of the case as published in the New York daRy papers. But it would seem from
the absence of any authority in the Fullerton case, other than
one cited from a court of very limited jurisdiction in Vermont, that the action of the New Jersey Court must have
been without precedent unless the Fullerton case was relied
upon. The action of the Circuit Court in this case was certainly a surprise not only to that portion of the profession
who had watched the course of the trial, but to the public
generally. But whether the impression, which was certainly
very general among the profession up to that time, that t ie
court had no right in a criminal case to direct a jury eitier
to convict or acquit has no just foundation, is a question of
interest and importance. It is doubtless well established
upon authority in this State that juries are not to decide questions of law in criminal any more than in civil cases.
YoI. XX.-26

(401)

402

ARE JURIES JUDGES OF LAW

In Carpenter v. The People, 8 Barbour 610, Judge WELLS
says: "The idea which has become somewhat current in some
places that in criminal cases the jury are the judges of the
law as well as of the facts is erroneous, not being founded in
principle or supported by authority. Courts of record are
constituted the sole judges of the law in all cases that comebefore them."
In Duffy v. The People, 26 N. Y. 592, Judge SELDEN insists upon the same principle f6r seven distinct reasons, which
are stated. And after stating that juries may find special
verdicts, leaving the legal conclusions to the court, says:
"When they find general verdicts I think it is their duty to
be governed by the instructions of the court as to all legal
questions involved in such verdicts. They have the power
to do otherwise, but the exercise of such power cannot be
regarded as rightful, although the law has provided no means
in criminal cases of reviewing their decisions, whether of law
or fact,. or of ascertaining the grounds upon which their ver*diets are based."
In The People v. Finnegan, 1 Park. Crim. Reports, p. 153,
Judge PARKER quotes this language of Judge STORY, from
2 Sumner 240: "It has been the opinion of my whole pro.
fessional life that the jury are no more judges of the law in a
capital or other criminal case upon a plea of not guilty than
they are in any civil case upon the general issue." He said
that in such case they had the physical power, but not the
moral right, to decide the law according to their own notions
or pleasure. That it is the duty of the court to instruct them
upon the law, and of the jury to follow such instructions, etc.
Judge PARKER says: "A wrong impression on this point has
1irevailed to some extent in the community, and it is time it
was corrected."
The right of the court to direct a jury to find a verdict
when no question of fact arises on the trial seems from these
cases to be as clear in a criminal as in a civil action, upon
principle. But that a broad distinctioii has hitherto obtained
in the two classes of cases, both in this country and England,
so far as precedent is concerned, seems also very clear. It
may be that this distinction has no other foundation than
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the false impressions to which Judge WELLS and Judge
PARKER refer in the cases above referred to. But there are
considerations which would seem to render the course pursued in the Fullerton case extremely dangerous as a precedent.
At a time when distrust of our judiciary is daily gaining
strength, and when the immunity of crime has become a
public reproach to the administration of justice, it would seem
wiser to take power away rather than to add to the power of
one man to convict or acquit of crime according to his own
caprice.
The judge always passes upon questions of fact to a certain extent in every trial, whether civil or criminal, when
he directs a verdict. That is, he assumes to decide that the
evidence is so clearly for one side or the other that there is
no question -for the jury. It of course frequently happens
that a certain amount of evidence is given in favor of the
party against whom the verdict is directed by the judge, and
it is not always an easy matter for the judge to determine
whether the evidence so preponderates in favor of the prevailing party as to leave no question of fact for the jury.
In all such cases then the judge _pro tanto assumes the functions of the jury. If in any such case the court should err
the aggrieved party has his remedy by appeal in a civil ae
tion. Not so, however, when the error is in favor of the
prisoner in a criminal case.
If the judge in a criminal case has a -right to direct an acquittal he must have an equal right to direct a conviction.
In the latter case, however, the prisoner has his remedy by
writ of error, while the people in case of a mistake by the
judge would be wholly without remedy in case of a capital
offense, even by a new indictment, and practically without
remedy in cases of inferior crimes.
These seem to be strong considerations in favor of what
has hitherto been understood to be the uniform practice of
criminal courts both in this country and England, to direct
the jury to find a general verdict in all criminal cases.
It will be seen that such a course must always be safe both
for the prisoner and the people. For as was said by Judge
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in the Fullerton case, "there was no doubt in
the mind of the court as to the right to set aside the verdict,
which might be against the law and the evidence," a new
trial would be secured by such a course, while in case of a
verdict of acquittal by the court the function of the jury is
wholly dispensed with.
In every jury trial there is a power on the part of every
juror to dissent from the direction of the judge. If all or
any one of a jury in a civil action should refuse to find as
directed by the court, the party aggrieved would have no
remedy but by a new trial. Whether a juror could be punished for a wanton refusal to find as directed by the court in
a case where there was clearly no question of fact to pass
upon, as in the case of an inquest, is not so clear. In England there was fornierly a remedy against such recreant juror
by writ of attaint, or by punishment for perjury. See
Worthingtgn on Juries, page 89 (Law Library N. S. Vol. 13).
There is no doubt but that the liability of jurors to punishment for misconduct originated when the office of a jury was
wholly different from what. it is at present. Mr. Worthington, in his able work on the subject of juries, at page 113,
says: "It is apprehended that the existence of juries in this
nation cannot be shown in any period of our history before
the introduction of the Norman Laws and Customs. But on
the supposition that juries had a prior existence it seems impossible that the most strenuous advocate for the remotest
antiquity should be able to describe from authentic records
what was the particular office or what were the particular
duties of jurors in the Anglo-Saxon courts. The first clause
of authentic information displays the recognitors and jurors
acting as witnesses of the facts which in civil cases were in
litigation and which in criminal cases were requisite to
establish the innocence or guilt of the accused person. Even
the four knights, the electors in the grand assize, were required to be of the vicinage; and the twelve knights were
to be 5Losen by them from the same vicinage simply because
they were required to be witnesses."
It is probable that the name "juror" was derived from
this custom. The derivation of the name seems more appliWOODRUFF

IN ORDIIAL CASES?

cable to one who is to testify to a fact than to one who is to
decide upon facts sworn to by others. But there is at this
day but little uncertainty as to the proper office of a jury,
which is to decide upon questions of fact presented upon
evidence produced before them upon trials.
As to whether there should be any difference in the practice of courts in directing verdicts in criminal and civil
cases that will best appear from a brief review of the statutes
and decisions in this State, which are referred to in Colby's
Criminal Practice, page 441. Assuming that the U. S. Circuit Court in this State is bound by-the 34th section of the
judiciary act of Congress of 1789 to pursue these statutes and
decisiqns, MR. COLBY says: "Prior to the Revised Statutes
there was no bill of exceptions in a criminal case andwrit of error thereon for review of convictions in the Oyer and Terminer.
The review was obtained in this manner: The court suspended passing sentence and certified the question which was
in doubt to the Supreme Court, who considered and passed
upon it and advised the court below either to grant a new
trial or proceed to pass sentence, and sometimes when the
convict was before them they passed the sentence themselves.
Whether the trial was to be reviewed was at the option of
the court before which it was had, and the party had no right,
as in civil cases, to take exceptions and carry up the record
for review. In case the judge consented to a review the
necessary time for that purpose was given either by the
court suspending its judgment or after judgment pronounced
by suspending execution." The Legislature in the Revised
Statutes altered this practice and gave to the prisoner the
right to interpose his exceptions and a right to the review'of
the case, and they adopted various provisions to carry out
their intentions. It will be seen by reference to this statute
that no provision is made for a bill of exceptions on the part
of the State. It seems to have been an open question in the
courts of this State prior to the decision in the People v,
Hartung,26 N. Y. 154, whether there was any right of review
on the part of the people in cases of acquittal in criminal
trials.

Chief Justice BRONSON in that case, after carefully

reviewing the English and American cases bearing upon the
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uestion, came to t1he conclusion that there was no such right
ind this was the conclusion of the court without dissent.
In 1852 an act was passed providing for a review upon
writ of error on application of the District Atcorney in cases,
of acquittal other than by the verdict of a jury. So tnat as the
law now seems well settled in the State of New Yoik, where
the accused is acquitted by the verdict, of a jury, there is no
right of appeal and no way in which any error, however gross,
on the trial in a criminal case, can be corrected on behalf of
the People.
If, then, it was contrary to the well-known practice of criminal courts in this State for the judge to direct a verdict in a.
criminal case, while it was an open question whether the
people had a right of review, it seems preposterous td inaugurate such a practice now when the judge, by an arbitrary
exercise of authority, can set at liberty the worst criminals in
our midst by assuming that there is no question of fact for
the jury to pass upon. It seems eminently proper then that
juries should understand their rights and obligations, and to
know that it is the right of a juror in any case to dissent
from the direction of a judge on a trial, and even if he should
stand alone the accused would only be subjected to a new
trial.
I have said that the Court of Appeals in the People v.
Hartung, 26 N. Y. 152, held that the weight of authority in
this country and in England was against the right of the
State to review criminal trials. This would seem to account
for the absence of any authority for the direction of a verdict
of acquittal by the judge. For, as already stated, an error in
such direction in a civil case could always be corrected on the
application of either party, while in a criminal case the State,
in case of a misdirection, was without remedy.
If the case of ex-Judge FULLERTON is to become a precedent in criminal trials in this country, it will appear to many
who heard or read reports of the evidence, unfortunate that
a clearer case of preponderance of evidence in favor of the
prisoner had not been the first to establish the precedent.
If there was no evidence on which the jury could have
rightfully convicted the accused there could be no danger to

